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Abstract 
The mediated semi-quantum key distribution (MSQKD) protocol is an important research issue that lets 
two classical participants share secret keys securely between each other with the help of a third party (TP). 
However, in the existing MSQKD protocols, there are two improvable issues, namely (1) the classical 
participants must be equipped with expensive detectors to avoid Trojan horse attacks and (2) the 
trustworthiness level of TP must be honest. To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing MSQKD 
protocols can resolve both these issues. Therefore, this study takes Bell states as the quantum resource to 
propose a new MSQKD protocol, in which the classical participants do not need a Trojan horse detector and 
the TP is dishonest. Furthermore, the proposed protocol is shown to be secure against well-known attacks and 
the classical participants only need two quantum capabilities. Therefore, in comparison to the existing 
MSQKD protocols, the proposed protocol is better practical. 
 
Keywords: semi-quantum; mediated key distribution protocol; dishonest third party; Bell states; Trojan 
horse attack. 
1. Introduction  
To establish a secure communication, any two participants must share a secret key. Therefore, the key 
distribution protocol is a fundamental part in cyber security research. In 1984, Bennet and Brassard [1] used 
the properties of quantum mechanics to propose the first quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol — BB84 
[1]. Further, some studies [2-4] proved that the BB84 protocol is unconditionally secure. In the classical 
cryptography, only one-time pad can conform to the unconditionally secure ciphers. Following the BB84 
protocol, various QKD protocols [5-14] have been proposed. However, these QKD protocols assume that the 
protocol participants have complete quantum capabilities, implying that the participants can generate any type 
of quanta (single photons or entanglement states), store these qubits in quantum memory, and measure the 
qubits using any basis, among others. Most of these quantum capabilities are expensive and they are difficult 
to implement at present. To improve the practicality of the QKD protocol, Boyer et al. [15, 16] defined the 
semi-quantum concept and proposed the first semi-quantum key distribution (SQKD) protocol that consists 
of two types of participants: the quantum participant and the classical participant. The quantum participant 
has complete quantum capabilities, whereas the classical participant only owns limited quantum capabilities. 
After the semi-quantum environment was proposed, various kinds of semi-quantum protocols have been 
proposed for different security issues, some of which are SQKD for different situations [17-26], semi-quantum 
communication [27-29], semi-quantum secret sharing [30-32], semi-quantum private comparison [33,34], and 
semi-quantum information splitting [35], among others. According to the existing semi-quantum protocols 
[15-35], this study summarizes the semi-quantum environments and the quantum capabilities of the classical 
participants in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Summary of semi-quantum environment 
Environment   Capabilities of classical user 
Measure-Resend Environment 
⚫ generating Z-basis qubits 
⚫ Z-basis measurement 
⚫ reflecting photons without disturbance 
Randomization-Based 
Environment 
⚫ Z-basis measurement 
⚫ reordering photons using different delay lines 
⚫ reflecting photons without disturbance 
Measurement-Free Environment 
⚫ generating Z-basis qubits 
⚫ reordering photons using different delay lines 
⚫ reflecting photons without disturbance 
Unitary Operation Based 
Environment 
⚫ Z-basis measurement 
⚫ generating Z-basis qubits 
⚫ performing unitary operations 
 
Although the SQKD protocols are more practical than the QKD protocol, the existing SQKD protocols 
are unable to let two classical participants share the secret key. Fortunately, Krawec [23] proposed the first 
mediated semi-quantum key distribution (MSQKD) protocol to resolve this issue, in which two classical 
participants can distribute the secret key with the help of a quantum third party (TP). Here, the trustworthiness 
of a TP can be categorized into the four levels summarized in Table 2, based on [36]. The trustworthiness of 
TP in Krawec’s protocol belongs to a dishonest TP.  
 
Table 2. Trustworthiness levels of TP 
Trustworthiness Level Definition 
Honest TP 
The TP has to follow the procedure of the protocol honestly and 
the participants can completely trust it. Therefore, the participants 
can share their secret information with the TP. However, the 
assumption of a trustworthy TP may be impractical. 
Semi-honest TP 
The TP has to execute the protocol loyally but it may try to obtain 
the participants’ secret information passively using the records of 
all intermediate transmissions and computations by the 
participants. 
Almost dishonest TP 
To extract the participants’ secret information, the TP may perform 
any possible attacks except collaborating with other participants. 
This assumption is only suitable for some applications such as a 
quantum private comparison protocol. 
Untrusted/dishonest TP The TP may perform any possible attacks. 
 
After Krawec’s MSQKD protocol, Liu et al. [24] used the entanglement swapping of Bell states [37] to 
improve the efficiency of the MSQKD protocol. Lin et al. [25] used single photons to design the MSQKD 
protocol to make it even more practical. In the abovementioned MSQKD protocol, the TP and classical 
participants adopt the two-way quantum communication to distribute key information. However, in 
comparison to the one-way quantum communication, the two-way quantum communication results in two 
issues. (1) The classical participants need additional quantum devices (e.g., the photon number splitter or the 
optical wavelength filter) to screen out the Trojan photons. Equipping these devices may violate the original 
intention of the semi-quantum environment (i.e., reducing the quantum capabilities of the classical 
participants). (2) Because the transmission time of qubits is more than doubled, the qubits in the two-way 
quantum communication exhibit easier decoherence than the one-way communication. Taking IBM Q 
Melbourne as an example, the average decoherence time for 16 qubits, T1 (for maintaining energy) and T2 
(for maintaining phase), are 65.30 and 22.70 µs, respectively. This indicates that if the transmission time is 
greater than T1 or T2, the original information in the qubits cannot be obtained. Therefore, the TP and the 
participants must spend more to maintain the qubits in a two-way quantum communication. Tsai et al. [26] 
proposed a lightweight MSQKD protocol without the abovementioned issues; however, the trustworthiness of 
the TP is assumed to be honest, which may be impractical.  
In this study, we propose a mediated semi-quantum key distribution protocol with a dishonest TP. In the 
proposed protocol, the TP takes Bell states  ,    as quantum resources to assist the two classical 
participants in distributing the secret key but the TP cannot obtain any information about this secret key even 
if it performs any possible attack. In contrast, the classical participants only need two quantum properties 
including (1) Z-basis measurement and (2) performing unitary operations. The proposed protocol maintains 
the lightweight property in terms of the quantum capabilities of the classical participant. Moreover, the one-
way quantum communication strategy is adopted to design the protocol, and thus the proposed protocol is 
immune to Trojan horse attacks, implying that the classical participants do not equip any Trojan Horse detector.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the quantum properties used in the 
proposed protocol and the proposed lightweight mediated semi-quantum key distribution (LMSQKD) 
protocol. Section 3 presents the security analyses of the proposed LMSQKD protocol and then provides 
comparisons between the state-of-the-art MSQKD protocols in Section 4. Finally, the conclusions are 
presented in Section 5.  
2. Proposed SQSS Protocol. 
In this section, the assumptions, quantum capability limitations of the classical participants, and the 
quantum properties used in the proposed protocol are described, and a lightweight mediated semi-quantum 
key distribution protocol is proposed. 
In this study, we assume that two classical participants, Alice and Bob, want to share the secret key with 
the help of a TP, where the TP is dishonest (i.e., TP may perform any possible attack to compromise the 
distributed key). There are ideal quantum channels between the TP and each classical participant (i.e., Alice 
and Bob). The classical channel between Alice and Bos is assumed to be authenticated. This study assumes 
that a classical participant has two quantum capabilities including (1) measuring the qubit using Z-basis 
 0 , 1  and (2) performing the unitary operation, i.e., the Hadamard operator H, where H is defined as 
follows: 
( )
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 Eq. (1) 
However, the TP needs to generate the Bell states  ,   , which are defined as follows: 
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 Eq. (2) 
The related assumptions and limitations in this study are summarized in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Summary of Assumptions and Limitations 
Assumption and Limitation Description 
Capacities of classical users 
(1) Performing H operation 
(2) Measuring qubit using Z-basis 
Capabilities of TP Generating Bell states  
Trueness of TP Dishonest 
Quantum channel 
(1) Ideal quantum channel 
(2) TP→Alice and TP→Bob have ideal quantum channel 
Classical channel 
(1) Alice ↹ Bob is an authenticated classical channel. 
(2) TP ↹ Alice and TP ↹ Bob are the classical channels. 
 
To enable Alice and Bob to share the secret key with the help of the TP, this study uses a quantum property: 
the relationship between Bell states and Hadamard operator. Here, Alice and Bob randomly decide to 
implement the identity operator I (i.e., do nothing) or Hadamard operator H on one of the two qubits (i.e., 
Alice implements the unitary operator on the first qubit of the Bell states and Bob implements the unitary 
operator on the second qubit). Then, they measure the qubits using Z-basis. The relationships between their 
implemented operators and measurement results are summarized in the following table, where Amr  and Bmr  
denote Alice’s and Bob’s measurement results, respectively, and 
Bmr  means implementing the bitwise NOT 
operator on Bmr . 
 Table 3. Relationship between Bell states and Hadamard operations 
Initial 
state 
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Operation 
Bob’s 
operation 
Qubit State 
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According to the above-mentioned relationship, we can determine the two cases as follows.  
Case 1: Alice and Bob can use their measurement results as the raw key bits or checking bits when they 
perform the same operations. 
Case 2: When they use different operations, they will discard the measurement results owing to the 
uncertain measurement results (i.e., Alice cannot use her measurement results to infer Bob’s).  
It should be noted that the measurement results are pure-random values in accordance with the property 
of measurements in Bell states, implying that Alice and Bob will share a one-time pad key (pure-random key) 
using this quantum property. That is, the participants do not spend the extra cost for generating the pure-
random key. 
This study assumes that Alice and Bob want to distribute an n-bit secret key. The steps of the proposed 
LMSQKD protocol are described as follows (also shown in Figure 1). 
Step 1. TP generates a Bell state from  ,   randomly and then, sends the first and second 
qubits of the Bell state to Alice and Bob, respectively.  
Step 2. After receiving the qubit, Alice (Bob) performs H or I operation on the qubit with the 
probabilities of 
aP  ( bP ) or 1 aP− (1 bP− ), respectively. And then, they measure the qubits using 
Z-basis to obtain the measurement results i
Amr  and  
i
Bmr  , where i indicates the i-th time 
measurement result.  
TP, Alice, and Bob repeat Step 1 and Step 2 n times.  
Step 3. TP announces the information about the initial states of Bell states to Alice and Bob using the 
classical channel. Then, Alice and Bob check whether the numbers of the four Bell states 
announced by the TP are balanced or not. If they are balanced, Alice and Bob will continue the 
following steps; otherwise, they will abort this session and restart the protocol.  
Step 4. According to Table 3, Alice and Bob discard the useless measurement results and choose the 
enough remaining measurement results as the checking bits (e.g., using 50% measurement results) 
to perform Public Discussion [1] to detect outsider or insider attackers using the authenticated 
classical channel. If the error rate is more than the pre-defined threshold, they will terminate the 
protocol and restart from the beginning; otherwise, they will continue the protocol. 
Step 5. Alice and Bob use the remaining measurement results in Step 4 and the relationship shown in 
Table 3 to obtain the raw key bits, and then perform privacy amplification [38] on the raw key 
bits to obtain the distributed secret key. Generally, Alice and Bob will obtain 
4
n -bit secret key 
if 0.5aP =  and 0.5bP = in Step 2, and they use the half corresponding measurement results as 
the checking bits in Step 4. 
 Figure 1. Processes of the proposed LMSQKD protocol 
3. Security Analysis 
In this section, we analyze the security of the proposed LMSQKD protocol. In terms of security analysis, 
the collective attack is a very important class of attacks because most of the well-known attacks, such as 
modification attack and intercept-and-resend attack, belong to it [39]. Furthermore, the collective attack is 
considered the strongest joint attack [40] (the most general attack). Thus, a complete collective attack analysis 
is given first, followed by the analysis of the fake photons attack and, the Trojan horse attack. 
3.1. Collective Attack 
For the collective attack, there are two types of analyses. In the first type of analysis, we need to prove 
that the attacker cannot obtain useful information without disturbing the original quantum system (i.e., if the 
attacker wants to obtain useful information, they will disturb the original system and the attack will be 
detected). In the second type of analysis, the amount of information that the attacker can obtain is analyzed. 
In this study, we want to use the first type of analysis to prove that the proposed protocol can be secure against 
the collective attack. It should be noted that a dishonest TP has more advantages than an outside attacker. 
Therefore, we consider the TP as an attacker to discuss the security of the proposed protocol. 
Before analyzing this attack, we first define the collective attack as follows: 
(1) TP can insert its ancillary qubits in each quantum system transmitted on the quantum channel and 
then measure the ancillary qubits to obtain Alice’s or Bob’s secret key bit.  
(2) Each quantum system sent between the users is attacked by the TP independently using the same 
strategy. 
(3) The TP can keep the ancillary qubits until any later time, implying that it can measure the ancillary 
qubits after obtaining some information originating from this attack. 
Therefore, a dishonest TP will perform a unitary operation 
EU  to entangle the initial quantum system 
(here, the initial quantum system is the Bell state) with its prepared ancillary qubits  0 1 1E= E , E , , En−  
and measure them later to obtain useful information from the proposed protocol by performing the collective 
attack. Here, taking +  as the example, 
EU  must comply with the theorems of quantum mechanics. It is 
defined as follows. 
( )i 0 0 1 1 2 2 3 3E 00 01 10 11EU a e a e a e a e+  = + + +  Eq. (3), 
where 
iE  denotes the initial state of TP’s ancillary qubit; 0e , 1e , 2e , and 3e  are four states that can 
be distinguished by the TP (i.e., the four states are orthogonal to each other); and 
2 2 2 2
0 1 2 3 1a a a a+ + + = . 
Because Alice and Bob discard the measurement results when they implement different operators, we only 
consider the following two situations: (1) Alice and Bob both implement the I operator and (2) they both 
implement the H operator. 
For the first situation, the quantum system can be given as follows. 
0 0 1 1 2 2 3 300 01 10 11a e a e a e a e+ + +  
Because 
0e , 1e , 2e , and 3e  are the four states that can be distinguished by TP, it can infer Alice’s 
and Bob’s measurement results using the ancillary qubits. By linearity, the quantum system of the second 
situation can be shown as follows. 
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 Eq. (4). 
Here, TP can also distinguish the four states 
0 0 1 1 2 2 3 3a e a e a e a e+ + + , 0 0 1 1 2 2 3 3a e a e a e a e− + − , 
0 0 1 1 2 2 3 3a e a e a e a e+ − − , and 0 0 1 1 2 2 3 3a e a e a e a e− − +  because these states are still orthogonal 
to each other, implying that TP can also obtain Alice’s and Bob’s measurement results in the second situation. 
In the proposed protocol, Alice and Bob take the public discussion to check their measurement result in Step 
4. Thus, TP must adjust EU  to avoid the participants’ check. If TP adjusts EU  for the first situation, it will 
set 1a  and 2a  as 0 to avoid the classical participants’ public discussion. However, according to this setting, 
the quantum system of the second situation will be given as follows. 
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 Eq. (5) 
To avoid the classical participants’ public discussion, TP must set 
0 0 3 3 0a e a e− = , which signifies 
0 0 3 3a e a e= , implying that TP cannot obtain any information about Alice’s and Bob’s measurement results 
in both situations. In contrast, if TP adjusts 
EU   for the second situation, it will set 
0 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 0 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 0a e a e a e a e a e a e a e a e− + − = + − − = , which  signifies 0 0 3 3a e a e= . Then, 
TP sets 
1a  and 2a  as 0 for the first situation. After the abovementioned setting, the quantum systems can be 
given as follows. 
0 0 3 300 11a e a e+  Eq. (6) 
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 Eq. (7) 
Because 
0 0 3 3a e a e= , TP cannot obtain any information about the classical participant’s measurement 
results by using the ancillary qubits.  
For other initial states ( − , + , and − ), the security analyses of the collective attack are the same 
as that of the initial state + , i.e., the dishonest TP cannot obtain useful information about the classical 
participants’ raw key if its attack has not been detected by Alice and Bob. In contrast, if TP wants to make the 
ancillary qubits distinguishable, its attack will be detected because the classical participants’ measurement 
results do not conform to Table 3. Thus, the proposed LMSQKD protocol is immune to the collective attacks. 
3.2 Fake photons attack 
In the proposed protocol, Alice and Bob use the measurement results of Z-basis to be the secret keys. 
Therefore, in addition to inserting the ancillary qubits in each quantum system transmitted on the quantum 
channel, TP can also use the other quantum system instead of Bell states to manipulate the classical participants’ 
measurement results and then steal their secret keys.  
The TP can take a single photon pair using Z-basis instead of Bell states, where the states of a single 
photon pair are generated depending on the original Bell state. For example, if the original Bell state is  , 
TP will generate the photon pair with the same state (e.g., 0 , 0  or  1 , 1 ); otherwise, it will generate 
a single photon pair with different state (e.g., 0 , 1  or  1 , 0 ). Then, TP sends the first and second 
qubits of the single photon pair to Alice and Bob in Step 1 of the proposed protocol, respectively. Because the 
photon pairs are generated by TP, it can determine the classical participants’ measurement results and then 
infer the information of the secret key bits. Unfortunately, TP’s attack can be detected by Alice and Bob in 
Step 4 because it has no information about the operators implemented by Alice and Bob in Step 2. This implies 
that when both Alice and Bob implement the H operator on the single photon pair, their measurement results 
may violate the relationship shown in Table 3 with the probability of 1
2
. Taking an example to explain this 
situation, TP generates  0 , 0  instead of Bell state +  and then, the classical participants implement 
the H operator and measure the single photons using Z-basis. Here, their measurement results may be one of 
the four possibilities  0 , 0 ,  0 , 1 ,  1 , 0 , and  1 , 1 . If the measurement result is  0 , 1  or 
 1 , 0 , Alice and Bob can detect TP’s attack by Public Discussion. Although TP generates single photon 
pairs using X-basis ( ( )
1
0 1
2
+ = + , ( )
1
0 1
2
− = − ) to avoid the abovementioned detection, its attack 
can still be determined by Alice and Bob when they both implement the I operator in Step 2. The detection 
probability for the fake photon attack is 
1 1 1
1 1
2 2 4
m m
   
−  = −   
   
, where m denotes Alice and Bob using m 
measurement results for the public discussion. It implies that if m is large enough, the detection probability 
will approach 1, that is, the proposed protocol is robust against fake photon attack. 
3.3 Trojan horse attack 
In terms of implementation-dependent attacks, Trojan horse attack [41-43] is common. In Trojan horse 
attack, the attacker can insert the probing photons into the qubits sent from the TP. Then, the attacker attempts 
to obtain Alice’s and Bob’s secret key bits using these probing photons. However, in the proposed protocol, 
the quantum transmission strategy of qubits works one way, implying that the qubits are only sent from the 
TP to the classical participants. Although the attacker can insert probing photons into the qubits, they cannot 
extract any information about the participants’ secret key because the probing photons cannot be retrieved. 
Therefore, the proposed protocol is immune to the Trojan horse attack. Hence, the classical participants do not 
need to be equipped with expensive devices (such as the photon number splitter and optical wavelength filter 
devices) to avoid Trojan horse attacks. 
4. Performance Comparison 
This section presents a comparison between the existing state-of-the-art MSQKD including Krawec’s 
[23], Liu et al.’s [24], Lin et al.’s [25], and Tsai et al.’s [26] protocols. The comparison includes the semi-
quantum environment, classical participant’s quantum capabilities, quantum resources, trustworthiness level 
of TP, quantum efficiency, time of maintaining qubit to avoid decoherence, and whether a classical participant 
needs to be equipped with Trojan Horse detectors. 
In terms of the semi-quantum environment and classical participant’s quantum capabilities, both Krawec’s 
and Lin et al.’s protocols use the measure-resend environment to ensure that the classical participants do not 
store the qubits. Although the classical participants do not need the quantum measurement devices, they must 
store the qubits for a period time to reorder them. The protocols proposed by Tsai et al. and this study only let 
the classical users be equipped with two quantum devices to ensure that this environment is more lightweight 
than the unitary operation-based environment. This type of environment is called lightweight unitary 
operation-based environment. For quantum resources, besides the protocols proposed by Lin et al. and Tsai et 
al., the TP needs to use the Bell states as quantum resources to assist Alice and Bob in distributing the secret 
keys. It should be noted that the TPs in these protocols are dishonest, except for Tsai et al.’s protocol.  
Furthermore, we compared the proposed MSQKD to other protocols in terms of qubit efficiency, which is 
defined by the following equation [44,45]. 
s
t
b
QE
q
=  Eq. (8) 
where sb  denotes the number of bits of the shared session key and tq  denotes the number of total qubits 
used in the protocol. In our protocol, TP generates n Bell states to let Alice and Bob share 
4
n -bit secret key 
if they set 0.5aP =  and 0.5bP =  in Step 2, and use the half corresponding measurement results as the 
checking bits in Step 4. Therefore, the qubit efficiency of our protocol is 2 1 8
4
n
n = , which is better than the 
others besides Liu et al.’s protocol.  
This study assumes the time taken by the TP to transmit a qubit to each classical participant to be t. It 
should be noted that the qubits reflected by each participant to the TP are the same. Because the protocols 
proposed by Krawec, Lin et al., and Liu et al. use the two-way quantum communication, TP and the 
participants spent at least 2t time to maintain the qubits to avoid decoherence. However, Liu et al.’s protocol 
requires the qubits to be reordered. Therefore, the time taken to maintain the qubits increases to r, to reorder 
the qubits, and thus the maintain time should increase r which is the time of reordering the qubit sequence. In 
contrast, the protocols proposed by Tsai et al. and this study only spend time t to maintain the qubits because 
they adopted the one-way quantum communication. Figure 2 shows the time taken to maintain the qubits for 
two-way and one-way quantum communications. Excluding the protocols proposed by Tsai et al. and this 
study, the classical participants need to be equipped with Trojan horse attack detectors.  
 
Figure 2. Time of maintaining qubits 
 
All comparisons are summarized in Table 4. According to the above-mentioned comparison issues, our 
protocol is better than other MSQDK protocols in terms of practical implementation.  
 
Table 4. Comparison with other existing MSQKD protocols 
 Krawec’s [23] Liu et al.’s [24] Lin et al.’s [25] Tsai et al.’s [26] Our protocol 
Semi-quantum 
environment 
Measure-Resend Measurement-Free Measure-Resend 
Lightweight 
Unitary Operation  
Lightweight 
Unitary Operation  
Quantum 
capability of 
classical 
participant 
(1) Generation 
(2) Measurement 
(3) Reflection   
(1) Generation 
(2) Reflection 
(3) Reorder 
(1) Generation 
(2) Measurement 
(3) Reflection 
(1) Measurement 
(2) Operation 
(1) Measurement 
(2) Operation 
Quantum 
resources 
(1) Single photon 
(2) Bell state 
(1) Single photon 
(2) Bell state 
Single photon Single photon Bell state 
Trustworthiness 
level of TP 
Dishonest Dishonest Dishonest Honest Dishonest 
Qubit efficiency 1/24 1/8 1/24 1/32 1/8 
Time of 
maintaining qubit 
2t 2t+r 2t t t 
Whether 
equipping with 
detectors or not 
Yes Yes Yes No No 
5. Conclusions 
To make the mediated key distribution protocol more practical, this study proposed a lightweight 
mediated semi-quantum key distribution protocol to enable the sharing of secret keys between two classical 
participants with the help of a dishonest TP, in which the classical participants only need to be equipped with 
two quantum devices. The proposed protocol adopts one-way quantum communication to reduce the time of 
preventing the qubits from decoherence and avoid the use of Trojan horse detectors. The security analysis and 
performance comparison are presented to demonstrate that the proposed protocol is secure and efficient. The 
key rate bound of the same semi-quantum key distribution protocol was discussed by Krawec [46] and thus, 
whether this work can be extended to analyze our protocol will be an important issue for future research.  
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